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STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS CERTIFIED
This Court has accepted the following questions for certification:
A.

Whether an exhaustion clause, which excludes underinsured motorist
coverage contained in an automobile insurance policy absent a condition
precedent, is generally unenforceable in the State of Utah as contrary to the
State's public policy, to wit:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL:

B.

1.

THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY INJURY
LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES THAT APPLY HAVE
BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR
SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS; OR

2.

SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING PART OF
THEM HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED.

Provided that the aforementioned exhaustion clause is not generally
unenforceable in the State of Utah as contrary to the State's public policy,
whether the enforceability of such clause is contingent upon the insurer
establishing actual prejudice to its economic interest.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

(b)(i) "Underinsured motor vehicle" includes a motor vehicle, the
operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability policy at the
time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability coverage
to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general damages.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(l)(b).
(4)
The inception of the loss under Subsection 31A-21-313(1) for
underinsured motorist claims occurs upon the date of the last liability policy
payment.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(4).
(5)(a) Within five business days after notification that all liability insurers
have tendered their liability policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either:

1

(i)
waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may
have against the person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or
(ii)
pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered
by the liability carrier.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(5)(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following his August 5, 2007 automobile accident, Tavis McArthur failed to
exhaust the liability limits available to him under the tortfeasor's policy, opting to settle
for $90,000 of the $100,000 in applicable limits.

As such, underinsured motorist

("UIM") coverage is precluded under the clear terms of his policy through State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), which requires, as a
precondition to coverage, that all liability limits be exhausted.
On August 5, 2007, Mr. McArthur was involved in an accident while riding on his
motorcycle. (R. at 8-9.) Following that accident, Mr. McArthur decided to settle for only
$90,000 of the $100,000 in liability limits available from the tortfeasor's liability carrier.
(R. at 62.) He then made a demand for the $100,000 in UIM limits set forth under his
State Farm Policy (the "Policy"). (R. at 62.) State Farm denied that claim due to the fact
that Mr. McArthur had not exhausted the full limits of the liability policy, a precondition
to coverage under the Policy. (R. at 62.)
The Policy's exhaustion clause states as follows, in relevant part:
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W
•• •

THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL:
2

1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY INJURY LIABILITY
BONDS AND POLICIES THAT APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP BY
PAYMENT OR JUDGMENTS OR SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER
PERSONS; OR
2. SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING PART OF THEM
HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED.
(R. at 86.) (Attached as Addendum "B".)
As a result of State Farm's denial, Mr. McArthur filed suit against State Farm in
the United States District Court for the District of Utah ("District Court"), stating causes
of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. (R. at 10-14.)

The parties then decided to submit the legal question, the

enforceability of the exhaustion clause, to the District Court by way of cross motions for
summary judgment, without conducting discovery.

(R. at 24.)

The District Court

granted State Farm's motion, dismissing all of Mr. McArthur's claims on the basis that
there was no UIM coverage under the Policy because Mr. McArthur failed to comply
with the clear exhaustion requirement and because the exhaustion clause did not violate
the public policy of the State of Utah. (R. at 61-71.) (Attached as Addendum "C".)
In reaching that conclusion, the District Court provided the following analysis:
Because the statute mandates all drivers to have a UIM
policy, absent a specific set of circumstances, and the statute
directs the UIM carriers to pay benefits only after all liability
insurers have tendered the limits of their policies, the
legislature has stated in clear, unambiguous terms both the
requirements of UIM coverage and the public policy of Utah
as well.
The contract language mirrors the statute in requiring the
limits of the other available liability policies be paid out
before the underinsured carrier, Defendant in this case, is

liable to make additional payments to the insured. Although
the Court is cognizant of the compelling public policy reasons
for exhaustion clauses generally to be void for public policy,
in the face of clear language from the legislature it will refrain
from so holding. The Court understands and is sympathetic
to the legitimate policy concerns, but does not believe its role
is to make policy and will leave that duty to the legislature.
Additionally, the Court is aware of other challenges to the
limitations of Utah's underinsured motorist coverage whose
public policy arguments were rejected by the Utah Court of
Appeals, [citing Phillips v. Farmers Insurance Group, 2005
WL 1477061 (Utah Ct. App. June 23, 2005) and State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Green, 89 P.3d 97
(Utah 2003)]
•• •

To reiterate, because Utah does have a statutory scheme
that contemplates and requires such an exhaustion provision
the Court finds this clause is not void for public policy.
(R. at 67-69.)
Mr. McArthur appealed the District Court's decision to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has certified the above questions to
this Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The exhaustion clause that is the subject of the first certified question is not
ambiguous. It clearly requires that third-party liability limits must be fully exhausted by
payment or tender before first-party UIM benefits are payable. Thus, the contract's
exhaustion is enforceable unless it is in violation of Utah's public policy regarding UIM
coverage.
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Utah's public policy is established by statutory provisions which define UIM
coverage and set forth the framework under which UIM benefits may be obtained. That
framework requires that all third-party liability benefits available to injured insureds be
exhausted by tender before first-party UIM benefits are available to the injured insureds.
The UIM exhaustion clause at issue here mirrors Utah's UIM statutory framework.
Therefore, the contract clause is enforceable as it is consistent with Utah's public policy,
as expressed by its legislature. This specific statutory approval of exhaustion clauses is
the public policy against which the contract exhaustion clause is to be judged. Since the
contract language does not violate this clear statement of public policy, other theoretical
statements about public policy which do not recognize the controlling force of the Utah
legislature's statement on exhaustion clauses are not relevant to the particular issue in this
case. Nonetheless, there are a number of important policy considerations that justify
exhaustion clauses, beyond the clear legislative approval, such as preserving UIM
coverage as an affordable, secondary coverage, maintaining clear guidelines for the
availability of such coverage, and protecting UIM carriers' subrogation rights.
Regarding the second certified question, the enforcement of exhaustion clauses
should not be contingent on an insurer establishing actual prejudice to its economic
interests. The requirement of actual prejudice was addressed in State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97 (Utah 2003), where the insured breached the policy's
consent to settle clause and then pursued a first-party UIM claim. The UIM claim was
denied because the insurer lost its subrogation right under the policy as a result of the
insured's breach of the consent to settle clause. This Court held that the first-party UIM
5

claim could only be denied as a result of the breach of the consent to settle clause, if the
insurer could show that it had been actually prejudiced thereby—meaning that it could
have recovered on a subrogation action if its right to pursue subrogation had not been
compromised. This circumstance is not present in the instant case.
The denial of UIM benefits here is not based on a breach of the contract by the
insured, but as a result of the insured failing to meet a condition precedent for coverage—
exhaustion of liability benefits. Further, the denial of UIM benefits is not dependent on
an argument that the insurer lost subrogation rights as a result of the insured's failure to
exhaust the underlying limits. Regardless of whether the insurer had any desire or
intention to pursue subrogation, the condition precedent is not met, and no UIM benefits
are payable. Under that scenario, it is difficult to define the elements necessary to prove
actual prejudice, other than the fact that State Farm will be required to pay a claim that by
the express terms of the policy is not payable. This prejudice would obviously be present
in every case where the exhaustion clause requirement is not met.
ARGUMENT
A.

UIM EXHAUSTION CLAUSES ARE ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE
THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH UTAH'S STATUTORILYEXPRESSED PUBLIC POLICY.

Exhaustion clauses are not contrary to Utah's public policy, as Utah's statutory
scheme anticipates such a precondition to coverage.

A state's public policies are

reflected in its statutes. See Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264, 1269 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (noting that statutes regulating marriage and divorce reflect Utah's public policy on
marriage); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Hurley, 90 Cal. Rprt. 2d 697, 701 (Cal. App. 4th 1999);
6

Lemna v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 652 N.E.2d 482, 484 (111. App. 3d 1995). Therefore,
when requirements or limitations on insurance policies are authorized by statute, Utah
courts reject public policy arguments seeking to invalidate insurance policy provisions
that are in line with those statutes. See Phillips v. Farmers Ins. Group, No. 20040297CA, 2005 UT App. 277 (Utah Ct. App. June 23, 2005). (Attached as Addendum "A".)
Moreover, this Court has expressed an unwillingness to make modifications to the terms
of an insurance policy in the absence of specific legislative direction.

See Allen v.

Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 804-05 (Utah 1992).
In Allen, the plaintiff argued for the adoption of the reasonable expectations
doctrine. In declining to adopt that doctrine, this Court stated that it was "unwilling to
make sweeping modifications in the public policy that underlies the regulation of the
insurance industry in the absence of legislative direction." Id. at 804. The Court then
recognized the "active and preeminent" role that Utah's executive and legislative
branches have taken in the insurance arena, noting that they have established a
"comprehensive regulatory framework for the insurance industry." Id Therefore, based
on the lack of any statutory support for the adoption of the reasonable expectations
doctrine, the Court determined that it could not alter the terms of an insurance policy
simply because it did not meet the expectations of the insured. Id. at 804-05.
Utah's UIM waiver provision is one indication of the legislature's willingness to
permit limitations on UIM coverage. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89
P.3d 97, Tfl6 (Utah 2003). Green involved a consent to settle exclusion in the insurance
policy which required the insured to obtain written permission from the insurer before
7

settling the liability claim. The plaintiff argued that the exclusion was unenforceable
because it was inconsistent with Utah's statutory mandate for UIM coverage, unless
rejected in writing.

See id. at |15. The court disagreed, finding that "[w]here the

statutory scheme allows consumers the option of refusing coverage altogether, it is
difficult to see how a policy exclusion that simply attaches conditons to coverage could
be unenforceable as against public policy." Id. at ]fl6.
Moreover, Utah's statutory scheme specifically anticipates exhaustion of liability
coverage as a precondition to the recovery of UIM benefits. In Utah, an underinsured
vehicle is defined as one that "has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the
injured party for all special and general damages." Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3
(l)(b). The Utah legislature has established that the inception of loss on a UIM claim is
the date of the last liability payment.

See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3(4).

Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3(5)(a) provides that within five days after
notice is given to the UIM insurer that all liability limits have been tendered, that carrier
must either waive its subrogation claim or pay the insured an amount equal to the limits
tendered by the liability carrier.
The District Court found that the fact that Utah's statute does not require an
insurer to waive its subrogation rights until all available liability limits have been
tendered is a clear indication that the Utah legislature does not consider a UIM claim to
arise until the liability coverage has been exhausted. (R. at 67.) As stated by that court:
Because the statute mandates all drivers to have a UIM policy, absent a
specific set of circumstances, and the statute directs the UIM carriers to pay
benefits only after all liability insurers have tendered the limits of their
8

policies, the legislature has stated in clear, unambiguous terms both the
requirements of UIM coverage and the public policy of Utah as well.
(R. at 67.)
In this case, not only is State Farm's Policy, specifically the exhaustion clause, not
contrary to public policy, it mirrors Utah statute and is therefore clearly enforceable.
That clause provides that UIM coverage is only available "when the limits of liability of
all bodily injury liability bonds and policies that apply have been used up by payment of
judgments or settlements" or such limits have at least been offered.

(R. at 86.) As

recognized by the court below, because "Utah does have a statutory scheme that
contemplates and requires such an exhaustion provision," that provision cannot be void
for public policy. (R. at 69.)
Inasmuch as exhaustion clauses are specifically contemplated by Utah statute, they
are not contrary to Utah's public policy. Although Mr. McArthur will probably cite to
policy reasons for exhaustion clauses to be void, such concerns do not carry the day in
light of the public policy established by the legislature.

The issue before this Court is

whether exhaustion clauses comply with Utah's statutorily-expressed public policy, not
whether those clauses could potentially give rise to any negative outcomes.

As

recognized in Phillips, Allen, and by the District Court, it is the role of the legislature to
make any policy change in this context. This is especially true in light of the fact that, as
noted in Green, the legislature has taken an "active and preeminent" role in structuring a
regulatory framework for the insurance industry.

9

Had the legislature perceived a

significant drawback to exhaustion clauses, it certainly would have addressed those
concerns. Instead, it continues to support such clauses.
Furthermore, there are important policy considerations that weigh in favor of
exhaustion clauses, in addition to the statutory approval thereof. One benefit of such
clauses is lower UIM premiums. The purpose of UIM coverage is to provide affordable,
secondary and supplemental coverage, not alternative liability coverage. See Green, 89
P.3d at fflf 18, 45 (noting that UIM coverage is a secondary coverage and recognizing an
interest in reducing premiums); see also Lindsey v. Southern Farm Bureau, 596 F. Supp.
2d 1245, 1249 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Curran v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 29 P.3d
829, 835-36 (Alaska 2001); Castle v. Castle, 453 S.E.2d 624, 630 (W. Va. 1994).
Without an exhaustion requirement, there would be nothing to prevent an insured from
settling for less than the full limits of the liability policy, then submitting a UIM claim,
even though his damages may not exceed the liability limit threshold. The UIM carrier
would be required to expend resources in determining whether the tortfeasor is
underinsured. These increased costs would only lead to increased UIM premiums.
Additionally, disregarding exhaustion clauses could lead to a slippery slope by
which courts and parties would be left with little guidance as to when an insured has
satisfied its obligations with regard to liability coverage. It would muddle the current
subgrogation scheme set forth by statute, which might cause two other problems that the
statute is designed to resolve. First, absent exhaustion, a UIM carrier's subrogation rights
might be prejudiced. Under the statute the procedure for exercising those rights is neatly
defined. It is triggered by exhaustion of liability limits and notice of settlement to the
10

UIM carrier. Second, it could interfere with the injured insured's ability to reach a full
and final settlement with the tortfeasor and provide a full release of all claims to the
tortfeasor because the status of the UIM carrier's potential subrogation claim against the
tortfeasor is not neatly resolved as it otherwise would be under the statute when there is
exhaustion.
Utah statute currently grants the UIM carrier five days after receiving notice that
all liability limits have been tendered to waive its subgrogation claim or pay the insured
an amount equal to the liability limits tendered by the carrier. See Utah Code Ann.
§31A-22-305.3(5)(a). If the liability limits are not paid or tendered, the insured has no
statutory obligation to give notice of the proposed settlement to the UIM carrier. And if
the insured is permitted to bring a UIM claim without payment or tender of the full limits,
then the UIM carrier's subrogation right might still exist because the five-day statute
would not control, which in turn could result in the insured being unwilling to give a full
release to the tortfeasor, but reserving claims for UIM benefits. Without a full release,
the tortfeasor's insurer may be unwilling to pay the settlement monies while still leaving
its insured subject to potential personal liability for the UIM carrier's later subrogation
claim.
Exhaustion clauses are consistent with Utah's statutorily-expressed public policy.
The statute is designed to promote settlement of the underlying liability claims. The
contract exhaustion clause follows the statute's direction. Invalidating the exhaustion
clause would not be consistent with Utah's statute and would interfere with the statute's

11

well-organized procedures and policies. Accordingly, this Court should find that the
UIM exhaustion clause at issue is enforceable.
B.

THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AN EXHAUSTION CLAUSE IS NOT
DEPENDENT UPON THE INSURER ESTABLISHING PREJUDICE
TO ITS ECONOMIC INTEREST BECAUSE EXHAUSTION
CLAUSES ARE SPECIFICALLY CONTEMPLATED BY UTAH
PUBLIC POLICY AND ARE A FUNDAMENTAL PRECONDITION
TO COVERAGE.

The second certified question inquires whether, even if the exhaustion clause is
generally enforceable as not in violation of Utah's public policy, actual enforcement is
contingent upon the insurer establishing prejudice to its economic interest. Presumably,
the prejudice which the question refers to would need to be proven in cases where the
insurer is required to pay UIM benefits even though the liability limits have not been paid
or tendered.
This Court should answer the question "no." An insurer should not be required to
establish prejudice each time an exhaustion clause's requirements are not met, as such
clauses are contemplated by Utah's statutory scheme and are a precondition to UIM
coverage under the policy.
The prejudice issue was addressed in this Court's holding in Green. As noted
above, that case involved a consent to settle exclusion that the insured had breached.
Therefore, this Court considered "whether the breach was a material breach relieving
State Farm of its obligation to pay benefits under the UIM policy or an immaterial breach
that does not void coverage." The Court first ascertained the proper standard to apply in
determining materiality. Green, 2003 UT 48, fflf 27-28. The Court adopted the actual
12

prejudice standard, citing to the holdings from a number of other jurisdictions which
found that "in order to justify foreclosing an insured's right to indemnification from an
otherwise applicable underinsured motorist coverage, an insurer must show that it was
prejudiced by the settlement of the tort claim." Id. at p O (emphasis added, internal
quotations omitted). Therefore, in order to deny coverage based on a breach of the
consent to settle exclusion, an insurer must show that "it would have had a realistic
possibility of recovering from the tortfeasor had its subrogation right not been foreclosed
by the insured's settlement. . . ." Id at f 33. In short, the Court recognized the essential
purpose of the consent to settle clause was to protect the insurer's right of subrogation.
This instant case is distinguishable from Green, and the bases behind the economic
prejudice requirement established in that case are not present here. First, State Farm is
not alleging that Mr. McArthur breached his contract, as was the case in Green. This
difference is significant because "[i]t is well-settled law that one party's breach excuses
further performance by the non-breaching party if the breach is material." Orlob v.
Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT App 430, 1J26, 124 P.3d 269. Therefore, as held in
Green, when an insurer seeks to completely foreclose an insured's right to recovery based
on a breach, an insurer must establish that its economic interests have been prejudiced.
In this instance, State Farm does not claim that Mr. McArthur breached the Policy,
it is rather enforcing a condition precedent to coverage - the exhaustion clause. There is
a fundamental difference between denying coverage based on a breach and denying based
on a failure to satisfy a precondition. In the case of a breach, the insured is being denied
a right that had otherwise accrued under the policy. However, if a condition precedent
13

has not been satisfied, then the insured's rights have never arisen under the policy, nor
have the insurer's obligations. See Watkins v. Henry Day Ford, 2010 UT App 243, ^|18,
239 P.3d 526 (finding that "where the duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon
the occurrence or existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may not require
performance by the obligor, because the obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's right
to demand performance, does not arise until that condition occurs or exists") (internal
quotations omitted). Moreover, the insured may still have the opportunity to satisfy the
condition and therefore recover under the policy, whereas a breach forever precludes
coverage. If an insurer is required to establish prejudice, even though coverage has not
been triggered, then the policy, not to mention the freedom to contract, is essentially
rendered meaningless.
Second, the primary basis for a consent to settle exclusion like the one at issue in
Green is to protect the insurer's right to subrogate against the tortfeasor. As such, this
Court wished to ensure that an insurer does not deny coverage based on a mere technical
breach, the failure to obtain the insurer's approval to settle, when the insurer had no
intention or ability to recover from the tortfeasor in the first place. See Green, 2003 UT
48, m 31-32. By contrast, exhaustion clauses serve a much broader and fundamental
purpose - to ensure that the tortfeasor is actually underinsured and therefore the insured
is entitled to the secondary/excess UIM coverage in the first place. The primary purpose
of the exhaustion clause is not to protect subrogation rights, even though subrogation is
resolved under the UIM statutory scheme. See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3(5)(a).

14

Another difference between Green and the present case is that a consent to settle
exclusion actually prevents an insured from settling the underlying case, even if the
settlement is for the full liability limits. As such, one concern that came into play in
Green was ensuring that UIM carriers are not permitted to exercise unfettered control
over the underlying litigation. See id. at ^18-19.* By establishing an actual prejudice
requirement, the Green court made it unlikely that an insurer would attempt to maintain
such control. By contrast, an exhaustion clause does not grant the insurer the power to
block settlement of the liability dispute. An insured has the right and ability to settle for
less than the full liability limits, and in many instances it certainly makes sense to do so.
Finally, from a practical standpoint, it would be difficult to establish a method by
which an insurer could prove prejudice as a result of the insured's failure to exhaust
liability limits. In Green, the insurer could establish prejudice simply by showing that it
"would have had a realistic possibility of recovering from the tortfeasor . . . . " Id at f 33.
There is no such easy test for the exhaustion requirement, nor should one be necessary,
because that requirement is about much more than preserving an insurer's right to
subrogation. Indeed, it could be argued that a UIM carrier faces economic prejudice in
every instance where it is required to adjust a UIM claim, despite the lack of exhaustion,
because it must expend resources investigating a UIM claim that is not ripe.
Accordingly, it is clear that a prejudice standard would be an improper and unnecessary
hurdle to the enforcement of exhaustion clauses. Further, economic prejudice would
1

The statute requiring a UIM insurer to respond within five days to notification that all
liability limits have been tendered was not in effect at the time of the accident in Green.
L±atljl9,n.4.
15

arguably be present in every case where a UIM carrier is required to pay a claim for
which, under the unambigous terms of the contract, there is no coverage.
As established in Section A, UIM exhaustion is contemplated and permitted by
Utah statute, and is therefore in line with Utah's public policy. In light of that specific
legislative support, a prejudice requirement should not be presumed, especially in light of
the fact that exhaustion is a fundamental precondition to coverage. If an insured has
failed to exhaust the applicable liability limits, then UIM coverage has not been triggered.
That should end the inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should answer the certified questions by
finding that exhuastion clauses are enforceable under Utah law and that no showing of
economic prejudice is required to uphold such clauses.
DATED t h i s 2 > day of February, 2011
STRONG & HANNI

Stuart H. Schultz
Andrew D. Wright
Andrew B. McDaniel
Attorneys for Appellee
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Charisse Phillips, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Farmers Insurance Group, Defendant and Appellee.
Case No. 20040297-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2005 UT App 277; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 269

June 23, 2005, Filed
NOTICE:

[*1]

NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION

PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt Lake Department, 020911489. The Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson.
COUNSEL: Kathleen M. McConkie, Bountiful, for Appellant.
Aaron Alma Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
JUDGES: Gregory K. Orme, Judge. WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, Pamela T. Greenwood,
Judge.
O P I N I O N BY: Gregory K. Orme
OPINION

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
We have determined that "the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs
and record[,] and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument."
Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented are readily resolved under applicable
law.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
See Guardian Title Co. v. Mitchell, 2002 UT 63, P 12, 54 P.3d 130. "In reviewing a summary
judgment, we accord no deference to the trial court and review its ruling for correctness." Price

Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, P 9, 995 P.2d 1237.
The trial court [ * 2 ] held that Utah Code section 31A-22-305(8)(b) specifically authorized
Farmers to prohibit Chansse Phillips from recovering undennsured motorist benefits given the
undisputed facts of this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(8)(b) (2003). Phillips now
appeals the trial court's decision on the ground that section 305 is ambiguous and cannot be
harmonized with other portions of the statute. We disagree.
The statute in effect at the time of the accident clearly provided that an insurance carrier was
required to offer undennsured motorist coverage only "for covered persons who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of undennsured motor vehicles," ch.
188, § 1, 2000 Laws of Utah 627, 628, and that the term "undennsured motor vehicle" does
not include "a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same policy that
also contains the undennsured motorist coverage." Id. These provisions clearly and
unambiguously preclude Phillips's claim.
Because such policy provisions limiting undennsured motorist coverage are specifically
authorized by statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(8)(b)(i) [ * 3 ] , (in) (2003), we reject
Phillips's public policy argument. See Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798,
804 (Utah 1992) (noting court's unwillingness "to make sweeping modifications in the public
policy that underlies the regulation of the insurance industry in the absence of legislative
direction" and its "tradition of deferring to the legislature on questions of general policy when
considering the validity of insurance policies").
Finally, Phillips has not met her "heavy burden'" of demonstrating that the statute violates her
due process right to receive compensation for her injuries. State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, P 8,
84 P.3d 1171 (citation omitted). Her brief is devoid of any meaningful analysis addressing the
statute's unconstitutionality, and thus we decline to consider her due process argument. See
Beehive Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2004 UT 18, P 14, 89 P.3d 1 3 1 ; State v. Garner, 2002
UT App 234, P 12, 52 P.3d 467.
Affirmed.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Service:
Citation:
View:
Date/Time:
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of record in the county in which ihc arbitration is
pending iq select a third one. The written, decision o f any I wo arbitrators shall be binding on
each party.
The cost'of "the arbitrator and anycxpert witness
shall Wpaici 'by the party who hired them. The
cost of'the tnird arbitrator and other expenses of
arbitration shall be shared equally by both partics.
The arbitration shall take place in the county in
which 'the insured resides unless the panics
agree to another place. State court rules governing procedure and admission of evidence
shall be used.
y/e arc rjot bound by any judgment against any
person or .organization' obtained without our
written consent.
UNDERINSURED M O T O R VEHICLE
— COVERAGE W

An underinsured motor vehicle docs not include
a land muuir vehicle:
1. insured under the liability coverage of
this policy;
2. furnished for the rcgulnr use ;of you,
your spouse or any relative',
3. owned by any government or any of its
political subdivisions or agencies;
4. designed' for use mainly off public roads
except while on public roads;
5. while located for use-as premises; or
6. denned as an "uriirisuretj motor vehh
cle" in'your policy.
Who Is an Insured - Coverage W
Insured - means the person or persons covered
by underinsured motor vehicle coverage.
This is:
1. the first person named -in the declarations;
2. ' his or her- spouse)
3. their relatives] and
4. any othtt person while occupying]
a. your car, • a temporary substitute
car, a newly acquired car, or a
trailer attached to such a car. Such
vehicle' has to be used within the
•scope of the .consent of you or your
spouse; or
b. a car not owned by or teased lo
you, your spouse or any relative^ or
a trailer attached to such a car, k
has to be driven by the firsi person
named, in the. declarations or thai
person's spouse and within the
scope of th'e pwner's consent.
Such o\her.person occupying a vehicle
used to carry persons for a. charge is not
an insured,
5. nny'person entitled to recover damages
because of bodily injury 'to an insured
under 1 through A above.
Deciding Fault and Amount- Coverage W
Two questions must be decided by agreement
between the insured and us:
1. Is ihe insured legally entitled to collect
damages from the owner or driver of the
underinsured motor vehicle; and
2. If so, in what amount?
If there is no agreement, these questions shall be
decided by arbitration upon written request of ihe

You have, this coverage, i( MV/" appears in the
"Coverages'" space on the'declarations page.
Wei'wjlJ'pay damages' for 'bodily Injun an insurdd is legally entitled "to collect from the owner
or driver o? an underinsured motor vehicle. The
bodily injury must be sustained by an insured
ana"caused by accident'arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an underinsured
motor vehicle,
THEft&IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL:
i ;• .-/THE LIMITS OF.LIABILITY OF ALL
BODILYINIURY LIABILITY BONDS
AND -POLICIES THAT APPLY HAVE
BEEN-. USED UP-BY PAYMENT OF
JUDGMENTS . OR SETTLEMENTS
JO]OTHERfERSONS\OK
'
2, SUCH 'LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR
REMAINING PART OF THEM HAVE
BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED.
Underinsured Motor Vehicle
means a land
motor vehicle:
1, the ownership, maintenance or use or
which is insured or.bonded Tor bodily
injury liability al ih"c lime of the accident; and
2. whose limits of liability'for bodily injury liability:
a. arc less than the amount of the insured's damages; or
b. have been reduced by payments to
persons other than the insured lo
less than the amount of the in*
sured's damages.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

TRAVIS MCARTHUR,
Plaintiff,

!

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE AND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
CaseNo.2:09-CV-416TS

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY; DOES 1 through
100; and ROB CORPORATIONS 1 liirough
10, inclusive,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the parties' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, and
Defendant's Motion to Strike Declarations of A. Bryce Dixon, This dispute arises over an
exhaustion provision in the underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage in the policy provided to
Plaintiff by Defendant1 Plaintiff argues that this provision is void for public.policy, while
Defendant maintains it is in line with and in furtherance of Utah's statutory language. Defendant
argues that Mr, Dixon's declarations should be stricken because he represents Plaintiff and

docket No. 13 at f 13; Docket No. 16 at 2.
1

000061

therefore should not be permitted to offer testimony in this case. Because the declarations of Mr,
Dixon could effect the outcome of the summary judgment motion it will be addressed first.
I. Jurisdiction and Venue
This Court has jurisdiction on the basis of Diversity of Citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a), because the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy, Plaintiff's personal
injuries and hospital expenses, exceeds $75,000.
H, Factual Background
Defendant disputes a portion of Plaintiffs undisputed facts. Under normal circumstances
when considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court would take the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party."2 In this case, however, the Court is presented with cross
motions for summary judgment Therefore, the Court will recite only those facts which appear to
be obvious and undisputed in order to put the issue into context.
Plaintiff was involved in an accident while operating his motorcycle3 Plaintiff received
$90,000 of the $100,000 liability insurance policy from the tortfeasor's liability earner.4 Plaintiff
made a demand on Defendant to pay its pohcy limits of UIM coverage of S100,000.5 Defendant
denied the claim because Plaintiff was not paid the full liability limits of the tortfeasor's
insurance policy.6 Plaintiff brought this action seeking payment of the pohcy limits of his UIM

"Durham v. Herbert Olbrioh GMBH& Co., 404 F.3d 12*9, 1250 (10th Or. 2005)
(quoting Riley v Brown & Root, Inc., 896 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1990)).
3

DocketNo 1 at «fl 7, Docket No 16 at 5.

4

DocketNo 1 at ^27, Docket No 5 at f 27.

5

DocketNo. 1 at 126, Docket No 5 atf 26.

6

Docket No 1 at %21\ Docket No. 5 at % 27.
2

policy.
HI. Motion to Strike
Defendant argues this Court should strike the Declarations of A. Bryce Dixon based on
Fed. R Civ. P. 56(e)(1) and Rule 3.7(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Plaintiff has
not filed a response to this Motion, therefore the Court is entitled under DUCiv R 7-1(d) to grant
the motion without further notice.7 However, before granting the motion, the Court will briefly
address additional rationale in support of its conclusion.
In support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Dixon has submitted a
declaration containing at least three statements of opinion:
1) My evaluation of Mr. McArthnr *s general damages -from the said motorcycle
accident was that they exceeded $200,000.
2) Because of his impecunious circumstances Mr. McArthur was constrained to
accept a $90,000 settlement of the available 5100,000 in liability,
3) Because the tortfeasor's insurance carrier refused to pay full policy limits, Mr.
McArthur's only alternative was to file a lawsuit against the tortfeasor, However,
the cost in time and money for such a suit would have been much greater than the
additional $ 10,000 insurance he was entitled to recover for his injuries against the
liability carrier of the tortfeasor. Therefore, he felt compelled by his
circumstances to accept less than policy limits.8
The issue presently before the Court is a legal one, whether or not the exhaustion clause
is valid, or void for public policy. Therefore the Court finds the statements made by Mr. Dixon
in his declaration both unnecessary and irrelevant to the matter at hand. Moreover, the
statements are in the nature of opinion, not fact, and therefore do not meet the requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P, 56 (e)(1),9 If the statements were relevant to the matter at hand, this Court might
7

DUCivR 74(d).

8

DoclcetNo. 14, at ^ 3 , 5, 6.; Docket No. 13 atffl 11, 19, 20.

9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1) ("A supporting or opposing affidavit must be made on personal
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is
competent to testify on the matters stated.")
3

consider them because the rationale for excluding the advocate from testifying are not currently
present.10 Because there is no jury at this point in time, the Court finds these statements would
neither confuse nor mislead the Court, regarding the attorney's role as both an advocate and a
witness, in its determination of this issue,11
Regardless, the Court finds these are opinion statements, not relevant to the current
determination and therefore will strike the declaration. Moreover, because Plaintiff has not
responded to this Motion the Court will grant it.
IIL Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.n In considering whether
genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines whether a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented,13 "When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial, if he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him."14
B. Discussion
Under Utah law, insurance policies are construed "pursuant to the same rules applied to

l0

See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3,7, Comment 1,1, available at
http://vi^w.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/chl3/3_7fchtm
u

Id,

n

SeeTzv RCrv.P. 56(c).

n

See Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 XJ.S 242,249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924
F.2dl82, 183 (10thCir. 1991).
14

FED.

RCrv.P, 56(e)(2).

ordinary contracts,'>15 The existence of ambiguity in a contract is a question of law,16 If an
insurance policy is ambiguous, all doubts are resolved in favor of the insured,17 If, however, the
policy is clear and unambiguous, the language is "construed according to its usual and ordinary
meaning."18
A state's statutes are a reflection of its public policies,19 If the plain language is
unambiguous then the Court need not look beyond it, and no other interpretive tools are needed
in analyzing the statute.20 In Utah, an underinsured motor vehicle is one that "has insufficient
liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general damages."23
"The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage is secondary to the liability coverage of an
owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle.. 4"22 Utah law provides:
Within five business days after notification that all liability insurers have tendered
their liability policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either (i) waive any
subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may have against the person liable for
the injuries caused in the accident; or (ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the
policy limits tendered by the liability carrier.23

l5

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, v. DeHenera, 145 P.3d 1 172, 1174 (Utah Ct. App,
2006) (quoting Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 133 P.3d 428,432 (Utah 2006)) (internal citations
omitted),
[e

Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272,1274 (Utah 1993).

11

Id. (citing Fuller v, Dir. of Fin., 694 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Utah 1985); Utah Farm Bureau
v, Onnlle Andrews & Sons, 665 P.2d 1308,1309 (Utah 1983)),
"Id. (citing Fire Ins. JExck v. Alsop} D.C, 709 P.2d 389, 390 (Utah 1985)).
19

Farmers Ins. Exck v. Hurley, 90 CaL Rptr. 2d. 697, 701 (Cal. App. 4th 1999); Lemna v.
United Seiys. Auto Ass 'n, 652 N,E.2d 482, 484 (01. App. 3d 1995),
M

R&RIndus. Parkf LLC v. Utah Prop, and Cas. Ins, Guar. Ass'iu, 199 P.3d 917, 92123 (Utah 2008) (citing Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998); State v. Barret, 127 P.3d
682, 689 (Utah 2005)).
21

UTAHCODEANK.

§ 31A-22-3Q5.3(l)(b)(i).

Z2

Id. §31A~22-305.3(2)(f)(i).

*Id. § 31A-22-305.3(5)(a) (emphasis added),
5

Utah requires insurance companies provide UIM coverage to every person in Utah who drives a
motor vehicle,24 UIM coverage may only be waived by an insured through an express written
form that "includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of the underinsured motorist
coverage and when it would be applicable."25
Insurance contracts are treated no differently than ordinary contracts, and interpretation
begins with the terms themselves.26 The contract in question contains the following "exhaustion
clause" provision:
We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled
to recover from the owner or driver of an underinsured motorist vehicle. Bodily
inury must be sustained by an insured and caused by an accident arising out of the
operation, maintenance> or use of an underinsured motor vehicle.
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL:
1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILYJNJURY
LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES THAT APPLY HAVE
BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR
SETTLEMENTS TO OTEEELJPEKSONS; OR
2, SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING PART OF THEM HAVE
BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED21
This clause is both clear and unambiguous, and therefore will be "construed according to its
usual and ordinary meaning.n2S tcWhen the language of the contract is unambiguous, then the
parties' intentions must be determined solely from the language of the contract."29 Therefore, the
contract provision will stand unless it can be declared void for public policy.
Decisions voiding exhaustion clauses on public policy grounds generally do not have

7A

Id. §31A-22-305.3(2)(b).

25

K§31A-22~305.3(2)(g).

^DeHeirera, 145 P.3d at 1174.
27

DocketNo. 16-3 at 15.

28
29

2003).

^/,850P.2datl274

Fortress Fin. & Pension Sew., Inc v. WatHns, 2003 WL 22753026, at *2 (Nov. 13,

state statutes authorizing or suggesting such provisions; instead the exhaustion provision is only
contained in the insurance policy itself.30 Other jurisdictions with a governing statute have Telied
on the plain meaning of the language in the statute in upholding exhaustion provisions.31 At least
one court has held the exhaustion provision to be void against public policy only when it was
expanded to Tequire the injured part}' to folly recover against a tortfeasor who was neither the
owner nor operator of the motor vehicle causing the injury.32
As discussed above, the Utah underinsured statute states, "[wjithin five business days
after notification that all liability insurers have tendered their liability policy limits.. ,"33 the
underinsured carrier must either pay the insured or waive subrogation Tights.34 The MerriamWebster Dictionary defines limit as the utmost extent.35 The plain meaning of this provision
must therefore be interpreted as an exhaustion clause. The insurer only has to pay within five
days of notification that the utmosi amount of the liability policy of the torfeasor has been paid.
Because the statute mandates all drivers to have aUIM policy, absent a specific .set of
circumstances, and the statute directs the UIM carriers to pay benefits only after all liability
insurers have tendered the limits of their policies, the legislature has stated in clear, unambiguous
terms both the requirements ofTOMcoverage and the public policy of Utah as well.
The contract language mirrors the statute in requiring the limits of the other available
liability policies be paid out before the underinsured carrier, Defendant in this case, is liable to
make additional payments to the insured. Although the Court is cognizant of the compelling
public policy reasons for exhaustion clauses generally to be void for public policy, in the face of

^Hurley, 90 Cal. Rptr, 2d. at 700; Curran v. Progressive Noiihwestem Insur. Co., 29
P.3d 829, 838 (Alaska 2001); see also Danbeckv. American Family Mutual Insur. Co.> 605
RW.2d 925, 928 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
"Zindsey v. Southern Farm Bureau, 596 F,Supp.2d 1245,1249 (W.D. Ark. 2009).
22

Pa. Mfrs, Ass 'n. v. Gordon, 1993 WL 427372, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21,1993).

33

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-305.3(5)(a).

"Id. at § 31A-22-305.3(5)(a)(iHii).
3S

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 302 (1998).
7

clear language from the legislature it will refrain from so holding. The Court understands and is
sympathetic to the legitimate policy concerns, but does not believe its role is to make policy and
will leave that duty to the legislature,
Additionally the Court is aware of other challenges to the limitations of Utah's
underinsured motorist coverage whose public policy arguments were rejected by the Utah Court
of Appeals. In Phillips v, Farmers Insurance Group ^ plaintiff challenged a trial court ruling
that the Utah Code section 31A-22-305(8)(b) specifically authorized Farmers to deny coverage
under that provision, Looking at the statute as a whole, and the provided definition of
'"underinsured motor vehicle" the court found the provisions "clearly and unambiguously"
precluded the plaintiffs claim.37 The court went on to state that it rejected plaintiffs public
policy argument because the policy provisions that limit underinsured motorist coverage are
specifically authorized by the statute.38
In State Farm Mutual Auto, Insur, Co, v. Green,39 the Supreme Court of Utah also
rejected a public policy argument to void a contractual provision in a UIM coverage plan. That
case dealt with a consent to settle exclusion which required the insured to procure State Farm's
written consent before entering into any settlement agreement40 Plaintiff argued that giving the
insurer instead of the victim control over litigation frustrated the scamte's goal of making
recovery available for victims of underinsured motorists.41 The court stated that "[wjhere a
statutory scheme allows consumers the option of refusing coverage altogether, it is difficult to
see how a policy that simply attaches conditions to coverage could be unenforceable as against

36

2005 WL 1477061 (Utah Ct. App June 23, 2005).

37

Zd.at*J.

38

/rf,

39

89P3d 97 (Utah 2003).

*Id. at 101-102.
41

Jd.atl01.

public policy."42 The events surrounding the Green case occurred before the current exhaustion
clause was included in the statutory framework, and therefore the court noted the requirement
that an "insurer respond within five business days to notification that 'all liability insurers have
tendered their liability policy limits/'' is inapplicable to this case43 The Green court also used
the above provision to contravene plaintiffs argument that the consent to settle violates the
purpose of the scheme, therefore, violating public policy.44
Although the Green court ultimately found that the insured must be paid, the basis for
that holding was that the breach, in noi getting the proper consent from State Farm, was not a
material breach. That outcome is distinguishable from the situation currently before the Court.
First, the Green court specifically acknowledged the statutory scheme controlling the present
litigation and alluded to the fact that had the current legislation controlled that case the outcome
would have been different.45 Second, the exhaustion requirement is a condition precedent to
recovery from the UIM carrier, not an ordinary term capable of being breached by either party.
A breach of this term would only occur if the liability limit was exhausted and the UIM carrier
still refused to pay.
To reiterate, because Utah does have a statutory scheme that contemplates and requires
such an exhaustion provision the Court finds this clause is not void for pub he policy.
Plaintiff Tehes on Utah's long held public policy of encouraging settlements to argue the
exhaustion clause contravenes Utah's public policy 46 Plaintiff also ekes case law voiding
contract provisions m an attorney-client fee agreement which give the attorney control over the
settlement of a lawsuit because such provisions "run afoul of the policy to encourage settlements

*Id.
«Id at 102.
"Id.
"Id.
%vn Head Construction, Inc v Gurney* 207 P.3d 1231,1235 (Utah 2009).
9

of causes and differences between persons,"47 Plaintiff cites to two cases, one from Montana and
the .other from Nevada, specifically holding an exhaustion clause void for public policy, both .aredistinguishable.48 The Augustine court recognized that "[n]either the Montana Legislature nor
this Court have specifically addressed the issue of whether an exhaustion clause in an
underinsurance policy is enforceable under public policy,"49 Similarly, because the Nevada
statutes do not include an exhaustion clause, the Mann court concluded that the "Nevada
Legislature intended that uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits be available to Nevada
citizens/150
Unlike Montana.and .Nevada, the Utah legislature has addressed the issue, The
underinsured statute itself contains language contemplating the situation. It instructs
underinsured carriers to make payments to the insured, within five business days after being
notified that "all liability insurers have tendered their liability policy limits."51 Because -the Utah
legislature has included the equivalent of an exhaustion clause within the statutory frame work
itself, and state statutes are reflections of the State's public policies, the contract provision in
question cannot be a violation of such policies, Second, the exhaustion requirement is a
condition precedent to recovery from the IHM carrier, not an ordinary term capable of being
breached by either party. A breach of this term would only occur if the liability limit was
exhausted and the UIM carrier still Tefused to pay, this is not the situation currently before the
Court. Moreover, as previously discussed, this Court will leave policy determinations to the .
legislature,
^Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Grayston Pines Homeowners' Assoc, 789 P.2d 52, 55
(UtahCLApp, 1990). *
*lAugustine v, Simonson, 940 P.2d 116; Mann v. Farmers Ins, Exck, 836 P.2d 620 (Nev.
1992), Both cases held the exhaustion clauses to be void for public policy based on the same
rationale, The courts stated the provision, promotes litigation and expenses, delays payment of
benefits, fails to consider legitimate reasons for settlement, and fails to acknowledge alternatives
to protect the UIM carriers,
»Id.
50

Id. at 649-650; compare Augustine, 940 P.2d at 120.

51

Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22-305.3(5)(a).
10

IV. Bad Faith
Because the Court finds the contract provision is valid, the CourtfindsDefendant did not
act in bad faith, Therefore, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs bad faith claim.
V, Conclusion
For the reasons stated above the Court finds the declarations made by A, Bryce Dixon to
be irrelevant to the issue at hand and are not factual in nature as required by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court also finds the contractual provision to be in line with the applicable
statutes and is therefore not void for public policy, It is therefore
ORDERED feat Defendant's Motion to Strike Declarations of A, Bryce Dixon (Docket
No. 18) is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pocket No. 15) is
GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 12) is DENIED.
At oral argument Plaintiffs counsel made an oral request to certify this question to the
Utah Supreme Court. This Court does not deem an oral request at oral argument as sufficient for
such a request. Further, this Court does not believe it is an appropriate issue for certification.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a judgment in favor of Defendant.
DATED December 9, 2009.
BY THE COURT:

TED S ^ W A ^ t
United $£at£s District Judge
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